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SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

On Augus t 10, 1990, the Equal Emplo yment Oppor tunity
Comm ission ("EEOC ") filed a brief amicus curiae in suppo rt
of
plain tiff in this case.

That brief reiter ates most of the

legal argum ents contai ned in the Brief for Appel lee.

In this

supple menta l brief, Price Water house will respon d to the EEOC'
s
amicus brief only to the exten t that it has not alread y
addres sed the impor t of the EEOC' s argum ents in its Reply Brief.
I

LIABIL ITY
Price Water house has demon strated that the Distr ict
Court erred in failin g to evalu ate or weigh the eviden ce on
remand under the prepon deranc e of the eviden ce standa rd,
instea d applyi ng a rule that presum ptivel y disqu alifie d all
of
Price Water house 's proof that its 1983 decisi on to defer
plain tiff's partne rship candid acy was based upon a legiti mate,
nondi scrim inator y criter ion.

Appe llant's Br. at 19-21.

The

EEOC in its brief amicus curiae does not take issue with Price
Water house 's analy sis of the Distr ict Court 's approa ch on
remand .

Indeed , the EEOC agrees that that was the approa ch

taken below , "embr ace[s] " it,l/ and urges this Court to adopt
it.

l/

EEOC' s Oppos ition to Appel lant's Motion to Strike EEOC's
Brief as Amicu s Curiae ("Opp. to M~t. to Strike ") at 4.

The EEOC, like the District Court and plaintiff, has
been unable to identify a single instance in which a court has
applied such a rule of evidence in a mixed-motive or other
multiple causation case in which the burden of proof has been
shifted to the defendant.

In fact, the Supreme Court's

decision rejecting the "elevated standard of proof" initially
imposed upon Price Waterhouse in this case pointedly emphasized
that "[c]onventional rules of civil litigation generally apply
in Title VII cases," Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 109

s.

Ct.

1775, 1792-93 {1989), and expressly stated that its decision
did not "traverse new ground."

Id. at 1789;

1795 {White, J., concurring in the judgment).

~

tl.§Q id. at

The Supreme

Court plurality opinion suggested that an employer could meet
its burden simply by "present[ing] some objective evidence as
to its probable decision in the absence of an impermissible
motive," id. at 1791, and Justice White added that "where .
the employer credibly testifies that the action would have been
taken for the legitimate reasons alone, this should be ample
proof."

Id. at 1796.
Although Price Waterhouse introduced both kinds of

evidence in the 1985 trial {see Appellant's Br. at 14-21), the
District Court on remand fashioned a novel evidentiary rule
that not only shifts the burden of proof to the employer in
mixed-motive cases, but creates a presumption that the employer
violated Title VII that is virtually irrebuttable.

This Court

should reject the EEOC's contention that this new and

-
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essentially unattainable standard of proof should be applied in
this and future Title VII cases.
The EEOC asserts that the District Court's approach
was proper here because, according to the EEOC, a
discriminatory "double standard" and "sexual stereotyping
permeated the [partnership] evaluation process, affecting not
only those criticisms [of plaintiff] that were overtly sexist
but also some that were couched in neutral terms."
at 12, 14 (emphasis added). 2 /

EEOC's Br.

However, in 1985 the District

Court found only that "unconscious" sex stereotyping played an
"undefined role"l/ in the-partnership selection process, and
on remand in 1990 the District Court refused even to evaluate
or consider the gender-neutral criticisms of plaintiff as part
of the evidentiary equation.

The court did not, as the EEOC

2/

The EEOC states that "a number of partners opposed Hopkins'
candidacy" and "[s]ome of these partners made critical comments
. . . which were couched in terms of her sex." EEOC's Br. at
3-4. But this is not a correct summary of the record. Only
one "opponent" of plaintiff's candidacy commented in language
that has been identified in this litigation as gender-related.
Compare Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 463, 466
(D.C. Cir. 1987), with App. at 37-49.
Moreover, the District Court never purported to identify
criticisms that were, as the EEOC puts it, "overtly sexist,"
EEOC's Br. at 12, but rather found only that a small number of
criticisms were phrased in gender-related terms that "suggested
sex stereotyping." Findings, App. at 222; ™ Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117-18 (D.D.C. 1985). The
District Court found, at most, that these few comments were the
product of "unarticulated, unconscious assumptions related to
sex." 618 F. Supp. at 1118.

l/

618 F. Supp. at 1118.

maintains, determine that either those comments or the
partnership selection process itself were "permeated" by sex
.
4/
stereotyping.Although the Supreme Court remanded this case for the
determination whether Price Waterhouse "had proved" its part of
the case under the "less stringent" preponderance of the
evidence standard of proof, 109 S. Ct. at 1793, the EEOC
incorrectly discerns from the Supreme Court's mandate a
requirement that Price Waterhouse introduce additional evidence
on remand on the issue of liability.

EEOC's Br. at 14-15.

Thus, for example, the EEOC states that "Price Waterhouse could
not rely on the facially neutral criticisms of Hopkins'
personality" without introducing "some evidence" that the
partners who criticized plaintiff were not motivated by
discriminatory animus.

EEOC's Br. at 14.

But the EEOC wholly

ignores the wealth of documentary and testimonial evidence that
Price Waterhouse introduce~ on this precise issue( in the 1985
trial, including uncontroverted direct testimony ttom. . some of

1/ It was never shown that the gender-neutral complaints about
plaintiff's treatment of peers and subordinates were in fact
tainted in any way by discrimination.
See Appellant's Br. at
20; Reply Br. at 2-3. Plaintiff's expert testified that some
of the comments might have been influenced by sex stereotyping,
but was unable "to determine whether or not any particular
reaction was determined by the operation of sex stereotypes."
618 F. Supp. at 1117. Although the District Court found it
"impossible" to label any particular criticism as being
motivated by plaintiff's sex based upon such testimony, 618 F.
Supp. at 1118, it allowed that testimony to sweep aside and
nullify every gender-neutral criticism of plaintiff's conduct
and interpersonal skills.

-
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plaintiff 's strongest supporter s and critics.
Br. at 15-19.

See Appellant 's

The EEOC does not explain why that "evidence of

the partners' motivatio ns"~/ was not -- at the very least
sufficien t to permit Price Waterhous e also to rely upon
"facially neutral criticism s of Hopkins' personalit y" on remand.
II

REMEDY

The EEOC argues that the language of Title VII "is
broad enough to authorize" the District Court's partnersh ip
order because it is of the same "general kind, class or nature"
as an order reinstatin g an employee.

EEOC's Br. at 20.

That

contention is completel y devoid of logic and any understand ing
of the nature of a professio nal partnersh ip.

"The relationsh ip

among . . . partners differs markedly from that between
employer and employee. "

Hishon v. King

& Spalding,

467 U.S.

69, 79-80 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring ) (footnote omitted).

EEOC's Opp. to Mot. to Strike at 4.
In its amicus brief,
the EEOC flatly states that Price Waterhous e failed to
introduce any testimony at all during these proceeding s from
partners who criticized plaintiff 's interperso nal skills.
EEOC's Br. at 14-15. Price Waterhous e pointed out in its
Motion to Strike the EEOC's amicus brief, at 4, that it did in
fact introduce such testimony in 1985, and that the EEOC's
statement in that regard was incorrect . The EEOC then changed
course, disclaimin g any intention to comment on the 1985 record
and, apparently , arguing that the evidence already in the
record was .iQ.sQ facto irrelevan t and that Price Waterhous e
could not rely upon it unless it reintroduc ed such testimony on
remand. Opp. to Mot. to Strike at 4.
It did not elaborate
upon or attempt to justify this peculiar theory. One possible
explanatio n is that the EEOC does not know what is in the
record in this case because apparently it did not read it.
~I

In fact, the EEOC itself has effectively recognized that
partnership status is different in kind from employee status
and that therefore "partners are not . . . covered by Title
VII."

EEOC's Br. at 21.Q/

The EEOC therefore cannot

rationally contend that an order compelling the creation of a
new partnership is in the same general class of relief as an
order reinstating an employee into an existing employment
position.
As Price Waterhouse pointed out in its opening brief,
at 30, the same logic that has led the courts and the EEOC to
conclude that Title VII does not apply to the relationship
among partners precludes a construction of Title VII to
authorize partnership as a remedy.

The EEOC responds that the

"same argument" (EEOC's Br. at 21) has been rejected in a line
of cases interpreting the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA").

However, the EEOC's reliance upon such cases is

misplaced.
For example, in Golden State Bottling

Co.

v. NLRB, 414

U.S. 168 (1973), the only apparent change resulting from the
National Labor Relations Board's decision to reinstate a
discharged employee as an "independent contractor" was that the
"driver-salesman" in question was given the opportunity to

QI

Notwithstanding the EEOC's equivocation in its brief, at 21
its own administrative decisions make clear that where
partners "are the co-owners who control and manage the
business" they cannot "be considered . . . employee[s] under
Title VII." EEOC Dec. No. 85-4 (Mar. 18, 1985).
& n.14,

-
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distribute soft drinks on a commission, as opposed to a
straight salary, basis.

See id. at 187-88.

In Oil, Chemical

and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1977), this Court concluded
that a discharged employee should have been reinstated as a
shift manager in charge of four or five employees at a helium
extraction plant.

Id. at 589.

Although both of these cases

involved reinstatement of an employee to a position not covered
by the NLRA, neither case required promotion to a high level
executive or policymaking position.

Nor did they involve any

sort of transition from employment to ownership status.

Such

cases therefore do not begin to answer the question whether
Congress intended to authorize the courts to order the creation
and continuation of professional partnerships under Title
vrr. 11
The EEOC also contends that the District Court's
partnership order was an appropriate exercise of discretion
Although the EEOC accepts that

under the facts of this case.

plaintiff's "misrepresentation of statements by the chairman of
the firm in an effort to pressure [partners] into supporting
her partnership bid" caused "the firm to decide not to

11

The EEOC also cites NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d
235 {2d Cir. 1953), where the employee had already been
promoted to assistant foreman. The question before the court
was the employee's entitlement to lost earnings related to the
delay in his promotion caused by the union bringing charges
against him for returning to work during a strike at the
plant. Reinstatement was not an issue in the case.

-
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reconsider her for partnership," EEOC's Br. at 5 n.6, 16, it
asserts that "[t]here is nothing inequitable" in compelling
Price Waterhouse to make plaintiff a partner.
16.

EEOC's Br. at

However, as the EEOC appears to acknowledge (EEOC's Br. at

16 n.11), this Court has previously recognized the "anomaly and
injustice" of reinstating an employee whose misrepresentations
called into question the employee's "reliability, veracity
[and] good judgment."

Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 117,

119 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981).

Like

the plaintiff in Williams, plaintiff in this case was the
"responsible agent" in her· ultimate misfortune, "'generat[ing]
[her] own fate."'

Id. at 119.

Irrespective of this Court"s

determination of the constructive discharge issue, this fact
alone should preclude the extraordinary and unprecedented
.
.
th·is case.S/
reme d yo f par t ners h ip
in

~/ The EEOC incorrectly assumes that plaintiff's own conduct
after the 1983 hold decision is only relevant to the
partnership question in connection with the constructive
discharge issue.
It also attempts, and fails, to distinguish
Williams on the grounds that that case "involved a plaintiff's
request that he be reinstated to the same job that he had lost
due to his own actions," EEOC's Br. at 16 n.11 (EEOC's
emphasis), whereas here the plaintiff seeks to be installed in
the new position of partner. That distinction is not only
without factual support -- plaintiff in this case seeks to be
placed in the partner position that her own actions
precluded -- but it also is irrelevant to the question whether
it is equitable or appropriate to order Price Waterhouse to
install plaintiff in "a position of trust and responsibilty,"
Williams, 663 F.2d at 118, where her own intentional misconduct
"removed any possibility that she would be accepted as a
partner." Findings. App. at 242.

- a -

Finally, the EEOC contends that partnership was the
only effective "make whole" remedy available because "a
monetary award

. would not constitute complete relief."

EEOC's Br. at 19.

In support of this proposition, it asserts

that "benefits accruing from a professional career are not
measured in dollars alone -- there is also the benefit of
prestige in being associated with an established firm."
Br. at 19.

EEOC's

Title VII, however, was not intended to afford such

intangible relief.

Rather, "Title VII deals with legal

injuries of an economic character."

Albermarle Paper Co, v.

Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (·1975) (emphasis added).~/
Furthermore, although opportunities for a position comparable

to a Price Waterhouse partnership "clearly existed" (Findings,
App. at 243-44), plaintiff "simply chose not to seek such a
position."

Id. at 247.

Plaintiff's complete failure to

mitigate after she left Price Waterhouse forecloses the
argument that only a judicially mandated partnership will make
her whole in this case.

~/ The EEOC is thus left to rely upon a case decided under the
Pennsylvania Human Rights Act, Human Relations Commission v.
Thorp Reed & Armstrong, 25 Pa. Cornrow. 295, 361 A.2d 497, 502
(1976), for support for the argument that monetary relief is
insufficient to make plaintiffs in partnership cases whole.
Title VII cases like Albermarle suggest precisely the opposite.

-
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III
CONCLUSION
This Court should reject the approach to evidence in
mixed-motive cases advocated by the EEOC in its brief amicus
curiae and reverse the judgment of liability against Price
Waterhouse.

Alternatively, if the Court does find Price

Waterhouse liable, the partnership order should be dissolved
and plaintiff's relief limited to back pay for a narrow period
following the 1983 decision to defer her partnership candidacy.
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